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1  Of course, since European monetary union, the G-3 currencies cover at least thirteen
countries–the United States, Japan, and the eleven nations that have adopted the euro.  In what
follows, we splice together the pre-single-currency data on the deutsche mark with the post-1999
data on the exchange value of the euro. 
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WHAT DOES A G-3 TARGET ZONE MEAN 
FOR EMERGING-MARKET ECONOMIES? 
I.  Introduction
While fashions concerning appropriate exchange rate arrangements have shifted over the
years, advocacy of establishing a target zone surrounding the world’s three major currencies has
remained a hardy perennial.  Work on target zones (pioneered by McKinnon, 1997, and Williamson,
1986, and recently summarized by Clarida, 1999) has mostly emphasized the benefits of exchange
rate stability for industrial countries.  More recently, though, analysts have apportioned some of the
blame for financial crises in emerging markets back on the shoulders of the volatile bilateral
exchange rates of industrial countries (as in Goldstein, 1999, for instance).  With many emerging
market currencies tied to the U.S. dollar either implicitly or explicitly, movements in the exchange
values of the currencies of major countries–in particular the prolonged appreciation of the U.S.
dollar vis-a-vis the yen and the deutsche mark in advance of Asia’s troubles–is argued to have
worsened the competitive position of many emerging market economies.  One solution to reducing
destabilizing shocks emanating from abroad, the argument runs, would be to reduce the variability
of the G-3 currencies by establishing target bands.1  This paper examines the argument for such a
target zone from an emerging market perspective but will be silent on the costs and benefits for
industrial countries.  
Given the reality that sterilized intervention by industrial economies tends to be ineffective
and that policy makers show no appetite to return to the kinds of controls on capital that helped
keep exchange rates stable over the Bretton Woods era, a commitment to damping G-3 exchange
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rate fluctuations requires a willingness on the part of G-3 authorities to use domestic monetary
policy to that end.  However, while trading patterns may become more stable in an environment of
predictable G-3 exchange rates, debt-servicing costs do not owing to the greater variability of
international interest rates.  The welfare consequences to an emerging market economy, therefore,
are ambiguous, depending on initial conditions, the specification of behavior, and the dynamic
nature of the tradeoff between lower G-3 exchange rate volatility and higher G-3 interest rate
variability.  
In Section II, we examine the contribution of G-3 exchange rate volatility to fluctuations in
the exchange rates of emerging markets.  The next section discusses the policy choices open to G-3
countries should their authorities enforce a target zone.  Section IV uses the example of a simple
trade model to establish that, for a small open economy with outstanding debt, the welfare effect of
damping variations in the exchange rate by making international interest rates more volatile is
ambiguous.  Evidence on the link between G-3 interest rate and exchange rate volatility and
economic growth in developing countries underscores the ambiguity of this relationship. 
II.  Some Background on Exchange Rate Variability
The argument that excessive volatility of G-3 exchange rates imposes significant costs on
emerging markets seems to rely mostly on a spending channel.  A large swing in the dollar’s value
on the foreign exchange market in terms of the yen and the euro translates directly into changes in
the competitiveness of countries that link their currencies to the dollar–either through a hard peg or
a highly managed float.  The evidence in Calvo and Reinhart (2000) suggests many developing
countries fall into that group.  They report a widespread “fear of floating,” in that many emerging
market currencies tend to track the dollar or the euro closely, even in cases that are officially
classified as floating.
2  See, for instance, International Financial Statistics, where the International Monetary Fund
calculates real effective exchange rate indexes using multilateral trade weights.
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From the perspective of aggregate spending, the relevant “exchange rate” for a small open
economy would be some index that averages across many bilateral real exchange rates.  Consider
one such index, wi, for country i, that is the geometric mean of bilateral real exchange rates, sij
(measured as foreign currency per unit of home currency):
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Reasonable weights, which presumably reflect bilateral or multilateral trade shares, would sum to
one.2  Because such an index is linearly homogeneous, we can write it in terms of the dollar
exchange rate for country i and corresponding bilateral dollar cross rates for all the other currencies. 
That is, if si1 and ó1 are the foreign exchange value of the dollar in terms of units of the currency of
country i and the trade share with the United States, respectively, we can write:
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Thus, movements in the effective exchange rate for country i can be thought of as owing to
movements in the dollar exchange rate of country i and all other relevant dollar cross exchange
rates.
For the purpose at hand, we can take the log difference in this relationship and treat it as a
regression equation to estimate the relative contribution of variability in the G-3 cross rates to the
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overall variability in emerging market exchange rates.  For about sixty developing economies over
three periods (from 1978 to 1983, 1984 to 1992, and 1993 to 2000), we regressed the monthly log
change of the IMF real effective exchange rate index against the log changes in the real
deutschemark/dollar and yen/dollar exchange rates (deflated using consumer price indexes), as in
the regression:
D D Dw a a DM a Yent
i
t t= + +1 2 3( / $) ( / $) .
The R2 of those regressions directly measure the systematic element of the effect of G-3 exchange
rate volatility on emerging-market currencies.  
Across the three periods, the countries split into two unequal groups, roughly along the two
axes of Figure 1.  Those countries where G-3 bilateral exchange rates are not important in
explaining the variability of the real effective exchange rate (measured by a low R2 along the vertical
axis) are also those in which the overall variability of their exchange rate (measured by the variance
of the monthly change in the real effective exchange rate along the horizontal axis) tends to be
high.  Conversely, as the advocates of target bands stress, countries with smoother exchange rates
find that more of the residual variance of those exchange rates result from changes in G-3 exchange
rates.  Also note, as is reported using a different methodology in Calvo and Reinhart (2000), that
the distribution of the number of countries between the two groups has not changed materially
over the two recent periods, except for a handful of outliers, despite the fact that countries have
increasingly identified themselves as floaters.  
III.  Exchange Rate Arrangements Among the G-3 Countries
In principle, G-3 exchange rates could be induced to stay within a target bands through
some combination of three tools.  First, national authorities could rely on sterilized intervention to
3  The signaling channel is addressed by Kaminsky and Lewis (1996); Dominguez and
Frankel (1993) examine whether there are any portfolio effects of sterilized intervention.  
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enforce some corridor on bilateral exchange rates.  However, except to the extent that such
intervention tends to signal future changes in domestic monetary policy, researchers have found
little empirical support that sterilized intervention in industrial countries is effective.3  Second,
national authorities could impose some form of exchange or capital control, presumably in the
form of a transactions tax or framed as prudential reserve requirements.  Opponents of such efforts
generally argue that capital controls generate financial innovation that undercuts them over time,
implying that the controls either become increasingly complicated or irrelevant.  Third, monetary
policy makers in the major countries could alter domestic market conditions to keep the foreign
exchange value of their currencies in a desired range.  This could take the form of allowing
intervention in the currency market to affect domestic reserves–that is, not sterilizing
intervention–or more directly keying the domestic policy rate to the exchange value of the currency
(as discussed in McKinnon, 1997, and Williamson, 1986).
Given the lack of evidence finding any independent effect of sterilized intervention (over
and beyond what subsequently happens to domestic monetary policy) and the consensus
supporting the free mobility of capital internationally, it would seem that the only instrument
available to enforce a target zone would be domestic monetary policy of the G-3 central banks.  But
this implies some tradeoff, in that G-3 domestic short-term interest rates would have to become
more variable to make G-3 exchange rates smoother.
IV.  The Consequences for Emerging Market Economies
To understand the trade-off between G-3 interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility from an
emerging markets perspective, it is important to remember that most developing countries are net
4  Behind the scenes of this model in the larger industrial world, it is simplest to think of
two large countries, A and B, specialized in the production of their namesake good.  The net effect
of our assumption about the small economy’s endowment and debt structure is that the intercept
of the budget line depends on the interest rate in country A.
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debtors to the industrial world and typically that debt is short-term and denominated in one of the
G-3 currencies.  As a result, the welfare consequences for an emerging-market economy of G-3
target zones depends on exactly those zones are enforced and the particulars of the small country’s
mix of output, trading partners, and debt structure.  
This can be seen in a basic single-period, two-good model of trade for a small open
economy, as in Figure 2.  This figure is drawn for a country taking as given the relative price of the
two traded goods that receives an endowment in terms of good A, which is the same good in which
its external debt is denominated and pegs its currency to that of country A.4  Volatility of the
relative price of the traded goods–which might stem solely from nominal changes in exchange rates
between the industrial countries if the small country fixes its exchange rate or prices to the
industrial country market–pivot the budget line and thus alter the desired consumption
combination in the small country.  Suppose, for instance, that the currency of country A
depreciates relative to that of country B, rotating the budget line from EF to GF.  All else equal,
welfare would decline, representing a cost associated with developments on the foreign exchange
market for this small country.
Target zones for the large countries, if effective, would be able to prevent the budget line
from rotating.  However, this reduced major-country exchange rate volatility will only be
accomplished if the major central banks change short-term interest rates in response to incipient
changes in cross rates.  For most emerging-market economies, which are debtors, such
coordination of G-3 monetary policy could deliver more stable terms of trade at the expense of a
5  Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) examine some of these issues in a small simulation model.
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more variable interest service.  In this particular case, the central bank of country A would
presumably have to raise its domestic short-term interest rate in defense of the currency.  So, while
the slope of the budget line would be unchanged, its location would shift in, as labeled HI. 
Regardless of whether the effects of the initial shock were felt through the exchange rate of the
interest rate, welfare in this small country would decline.  Whether they decline more or less if the
large countries allow the cross exchange rate or their interest rates to adjust will depend on many
factors.5
It may well be the case that the change in G-3 interest rates might understate the shift in the
budget line if capital flows are procyclical, in which case a change in the industrial country interest
rate would change the developing country’s interest-rate risk premium in the same direction,
implying a larger net movement in overall borrowing costs.  Moreover, one could posit
nonlinearities in the response if large increases in borrowing costs--by inducing balance-sheet strains
and credit rationing--have more substantial effects on income prospects than do similar size
reductions in borrowing costs.
Some sense of the stakes for emerging-market economies can be gotten from Table 1.  We
calculated simple annual averages of the absolute value of the monthly changes in the logarithms of
the deutsche mark/dollar and yen/dollar exchange rates from 1974 to 1999 and the percentage
point change in the U.S Treasury bill rate (on the rationale that most developing country borrowing
is denominated in U.S. dollars).  We then divided the sample into four cells corresponding to the
combinations possible when those two volatility measures were above or below their respective
median values.  
Section A of the table reports the average annual growth rates of real GDP in developing
6  Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) address this in a fuller multivariate context.
7  The results are similar using the methodology of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
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countries.  As is evident from the first column, economic growth in developing countries tends to
be faster against a backdrop of more stable U.S. short-term interest rates.  Moreover, over the past
twenty years it would have been a bad bet for developing countries to trade times when G-3 foreign
exchange rates were volatile but U.S. interest rates stable (the lower left cell) for times when G-3
foreign exchange rates were stable but U.S. interest rates were volatile (the upper right cell).  The 1-
1/4 percentage point difference in real GDP growth between the two cells does suggest some
caution in assuming that emerging-market economies necessarily benefit from reduced exchange
rate variability of the G-3 currencies.6  
The lower two panels address the possibility of nonlinearities in the responses of developing
countries by using an indicator approach.  In panel B, data on the number of currency crises in
developing countries by year are sorted according to G-3 exchange rate and interest rate volatility
(with the crisis indicator defined according to the methodology in Frankel and Rose, 1996, as
recently updated and extended to a larger country set by Reinhart, 2000).7   Panel C reports similar
calculations using the number of banking crises from the same source.  As can be seen in the first
column of both panels, years in which interest-rate volatility in the United States was below its
median over the past twenty years were associated with relatively fewer crises in developing
countries.  But it is also the case that low G-3 exchange rate volatility (the two top rows) was also
associated with fewer crises.  Thus, while low volatilities in financial asset prices appear conducive to
avoiding crisis in developing countries, the net benefit of trading between G-3 exchange rate and
interest-rate volatility would seem to be ambiguous.
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Figure 1
1993 to July 2000 
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Table 1:  Economic Outcomes in Developing Countries and G-3
Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Volatility, 1980 to 1999
A.  Real GDP Growth (percent, annual rate)
U.S. interest rate
G-3 exchange rates Low volatility High volatility
Low volatility 5.14 4.32
High volatility 5.46 4.52
B. Incidence of currency crisis (using the definition of Frankel and
Rose, 1996, percent of 55 total events)
U.S. interest rate
G-3 exchange rates Low volatility High volatility
Low volatility 12.7 27.3
High volatility 30.9 29.1
C.  Incidence of banking crisis (using the definition of Frankel and
Rose, 1996, percent of 66 total events)
U.S. interest rate
G-3 exchange rates Low volatility High volatility
Low volatility 16.7 28.8
High volatility 28.8 26.7
Source: Real GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook (2000); incidence of
currency and banking crises, Reinhart (2000).  The sample is divided based
on the medians of the annual averages of the monthly absolute change in
the logarithms of the yen/dollar and deutsche-mark/dollar exchange rates
and in the percentage point change in the nominal U.S. three-month
Treasury bill rate.
